Course description

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A course is the basic teaching unit, it's design as a medium for a student to acquire comprehensive knowledge and skills indispensable in the given field. A course guarantor is responsible for the factual content of the course.
For each course, there is a department responsible for the course organisation. A person responsible for timetabling for a given department sets a time schedule of teaching and for each class, s/he assigns an instructor and/or an examiner.
Expected time consumption of the course is expressed by a course attribute extent of teaching. For example, extent = 2 +2 indicates two teaching hours of lectures and two teaching hours of seminar (lab) per week.
At the end of each semester, the course instructor has to evaluate the extent to which a student has acquired the expected knowledge and skills. The type of this evaluation is indicated by the attribute completion. So, a course can be completed by just an assessment ('pouze zápočet'), by a graded assessment ('klasifikovaný zápočet'), or by just an examination ('pouze zkouška') or by an assessment and examination ('zápočet a zkouška') .
The difficulty of a given course is evaluated by the amount of ECTS credits.
The course is in session (cf. teaching is going on) during a semester. Each course is offered either in the winter ('zimní') or summer ('letní') semester of an academic year. Exceptionally, a course might be offered in both semesters.
The subject matter of a course is described in various texts.

NI-VOL Elections Extent of teaching: 2P+1C

Instructor: Knop D. Completion: Z,ZK

Department: 18101 Credits: 5 Semester: L

Annotation:
We will cover the basics of (committee) elections and, in general, opinion aggregation.

Lecture syllabus:

1) motivation & single winner rules

2) single winner rules and their properties

3) Impossibility Theorems I 4) Strategic behaviour & manipulation in voting

5) Impossibility Theorems II

6) Domain restriction in voting

7) Computational complexity of Winner determination

8) Possible / Necessary Winner

9) Referenda

10) Committee Election I 11) Committee Election II

12) Liquid Democracy

Seminar syllabus:

1) motivation & single winner rules, single winner rules and their properties

2) Impossibility Theorems I, Strategic behaviour & manipulation in voting

3) Impossibility Theorems II, Domain restriction in voting

4) Computational complexity of Winner determination, Possible / Necessary Winner

5) Referenda, Committee Election I 6) Committee Election II, Liquid Democracy

Literature:
Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Ariel D. Procaccia (eds.). Dostupné online z http://www.cambridge.org/download_file/951600

E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, and A. Slinko. Properties of Multiwinner Voting Rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 48(3): 599-632, 2017.

V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and J. Lang. When are Elections with Few Candidates Hard to Manipulate? Journal of the ACM, 54(3), Article 14, 2007

A. D. Taylor. The Manipulability of Voting Systems. The American Mathematical Monthly, 109(4):321-337, 2002.

E. Edith, M. Lackner, and D. Peters. Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey. 2022.

Requirements:
Předpokládáme, že student ovládá základní znalosti algoritmizace (které si mohl osvojit například v předmětu BI-AG1: Algoritmy a grafy I) a teorie složitosti (BI-AAG: Automaty a gramatiky). Výhodou je, pokud student absolvoval kurz NI-CPX, ale není podmínkou.

Výukové materiály na https://courses.fit.cvut.cz/NI-VOL/

The course is also part of the following Study plans:

Study Plan Study Branch/Specialization Role Recommended semester

NI-PB.2020 Computer Security V Není

NI-ZI.2020 Knowledge Engineering V Není

NI-SPOL.2020 Unspecified Branch/Specialisation of Study V Není

NI-TI.2020 Computer Science V Není

NI-TI.2023 Computer Science V Není

NI-NPVS.2020 Design and Programming of Embedded Systems V Není

NI-PSS.2020 Computer Systems and Networks V Není

NI-MI.2020 Managerial Informatics V Není

NI-SI.2020 Software Engineering (in Czech) V Není

NI-SP.2020 System Programming V Není

NI-WI.2020 Web Engineering V Není

NI-SP.2023 System Programming V Není

Page updated 25. 4. 2024, semester: Z,L/2023-4, Z/2019-20, Z/2024-5, L/2022-3, Z/2020-1, Z,L/2021-2, L/2020-1, Z/2022-3, L/2019-20, Send comments to the content presented here to Administrator of study plans Design and implementation: J. Novák, I. Halaška

NI-VOL	Elections			Extent of teaching:	2P+1C
Instructor:	Knop D.			Completion:	Z,ZK
Department:	18101	Credits:	5	Semester:	L

1)		motivation & single winner rules
2)		single winner rules and their properties
3)		Impossibility Theorems I 4) Strategic behaviour & manipulation in voting
5)		Impossibility Theorems II
6)		Domain restriction in voting
7)		Computational complexity of Winner determination
8)		Possible / Necessary Winner
9)		Referenda
10)		Committee Election I 11) Committee Election II
12)		Liquid Democracy

1)		motivation & single winner rules, single winner rules and their properties
2)		Impossibility Theorems I, Strategic behaviour & manipulation in voting
3)		Impossibility Theorems II, Domain restriction in voting
4)		Computational complexity of Winner determination, Possible / Necessary Winner
5)		Referenda, Committee Election I 6) Committee Election II, Liquid Democracy

E.		Elkind, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, and A. Slinko. Properties of Multiwinner Voting Rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 48(3): 599-632, 2017.
V.		Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and J. Lang. When are Elections with Few Candidates Hard to Manipulate? Journal of the ACM, 54(3), Article 14, 2007
A.		D. Taylor. The Manipulability of Voting Systems. The American Mathematical Monthly, 109(4):321-337, 2002.
E.		Edith, M. Lackner, and D. Peters. Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey. 2022.